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Abstract:  This paper examines the optimal financial markets liberalization policy for a large country in a 
two-country general equilibrium production economy.  In our model, household’s portfolio choice is 
modeled separately from firm’s investment decision and financial markets play an important role in the 
allocation of capital between production technologies.  We find that the type of production technology, 
specifically whether it exhibits decreasing returns to scale in capital, is an important factor in evaluating 
the welfare gains from financial markets liberalization, and hence the optimal financial structure for a 
country.  As financial markets become liberalized, there is gain from efficient capital allocation as a result 
of improved sharing risk sharing.  On the other hand, a less wealthy country will not be able to gain by 
borrowing at a lower risk-free rate and reinvesting in a more productive risky technology when financial 
markets are completely liberalized.  When production technologies exhibit decreasing returns to scale, the 
gain from efficient capital allocation as a result of financial markets liberalization dominates the 
opportunity cost of higher borrowing rate for the less wealthy country.  Consequently, complete financial 
markets liberalization is more likely to be optimal when production technologies exhibit decreasing 
returns to capital. 
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1.  Introduction 
What is the optimal degree of financial markets liberalization for a large country or economic bloc?  
While the financial markets in many large economies have been increasingly liberalized over the 
twenty-five years since the breakdown of B retton Woods system, it is still a debatable issue 
whether the structure of financial systems has been welfare improving for each individual economy.  
Past experiences of financial crises within blocs of emerging markets (such as Asia and Latin 
America) with free capital flows into these financial markets have cast doubts on the benefits of 
world financial integration among policy makers and academia.  Recently, there has been a reversal 
of view as a growing amount of empirical evidence (e.g. Levine and Zervos (1998), Bekaert, 
Harvey and Lundblad (2001), Edwards (2001) and Rajan and Zingales (2001)) points to the 
positive influence of financial liberalization on economic growth.  On the theoretical front, welfare 
gains (often defined by lifetime utility derived from consumption) from financial liberalization are 
less clear and very much dependent on the modeling framework.  In this paper, we attempt to relate 
the empirical evidence and theoretical literature on financial markets liberalization by focusing on 
the macroeconomic fundamentals of production and the substitutability between the real goods 
market and financial markets in the role of risk sharing.  Specifically, we allow for a non-linear 
production technology in capital and analyze how welfare gains a nd consumption growth from 
financial liberalization would be affected by the returns to capital in the production technology. 
In the finance literature, the role of financial markets for sharing production risks across 
countries has been well established, yet its interaction with production in the real goods markets is 
explored to a lesser degree. The welfare gains from complete financial market liberalization relative 
to financial autarky have been studied both under ideal and less-than-perfect conditions in exchange 
and production economies.  The magnitudes of welfare gains from these studies have been found to 
be relatively sensitive to the model setups and parameter assumptions. In general, welfare gains will 
be greater when investors are more risk-averse and/or when the ability to share risk expands the 
production frontier with investment in riskier but higher-growth production as discussed in Obstfeld 
(1994), even in the presence of frictions in international commodity markets as found in Dumas and 
Uppal (2001). 
On the other hand, the welfare consequences of moving from partially segmented financial 
markets to completely liberalized financial markets are more controversial, where it is not entirely 
apparent that the shift is always welfare-enhancing.  For example, Devereux and Saito (1997) and 
Basak (1996) find the result that less wealthy countries may be worse off with full financial   2 
integration. In view of this result, there is an argument that complete financial market liberalization 
may not necessary be optimal for all countries.  The intuition behind the result is that “less wealthy” 
countries could borrow at a lower risk-free rate and invest at a higher rate of return when financial 
markets are not fully liberalized.  The gain from the disparity between the return on reinvestment 
and cost of borrowed capital with restricted relative to complete liberalized financial markets may 
very well outweigh the loss from imperfect risk sharing.  Consequently, these models find support 
for partial financial market liberalization.  
Our analysis is complementary to these models in that we adopt a portfolio choice 
framework with focus on the production side of the economy, where we allow production to exhibit 
decreasing returns to capital.  The link between investment in production and portfolio choice 
allows the financial markets to play a role in efficient capital allocation in addition to risk sharing.  
Our contribution to the current literature comes mainly from endogenizing the marginal product of 
capital such that it is dependent on investment.  
We examine the optimal discrete level
1 of financial market liberalization for each country in 
a two-country world economy, where each country can differ in its initial capital and labor 
endowment, as well as productivity growth.  As we adopt a general equilibrium approach to 
modeling, our analysis would apply more suitably to economic blocs such as Asia, Latin America, 
Europe and North America, or big economies such as China, India and the G7 countries.  We 
investigate under what conditions of the production function technology would a country benefit 
from full financial markets liberalization.  The model we develop is a generalization of the 
production economy in Sellin and Werner (1993).  Our model considers more general preferences 
and production technologies and also, separates household’s portfolio choice from the firm’s 
investment decisions.  The risk-free rate in our model is derived from the household’s intertemporal 
consumption decisions and comprises of two components - the intertemporal marginal product of 
capital and the risk premium in the financial markets.  Therefore, the production technology as well 
as the level of financial liberalization in the economy will jointly determine the cost of borrowing 
and through this, the investment decision of each country. 
We show that linear technology is a very special case within our modeling framework and 
welfare analysis of financial markets liberalization with this restrictive assumption on technology 
                                                             
1 Discrete level of financial market liberalization refers to a binary (rather than a percentage) restriction 
on market participation, which is an extreme form of segmentation. For example, stock markets are either 
completely closed or open to foreign investors in our analysis, while in practice, they are usually 
restricted in terms of the percentage of home assets that can be held by foreign investors.    3 
may not extend to  a more general form of Cobb-Douglas production function.  With linear 
technology, a country will benefit by restricting foreign trading in its domestic stock markets so that 
it can effectively borrow at a lower world risk-free rate to invest in a riskier and higher growth 
production that grows proportionally with every additional unit of capital input.  This result is 
consistent with findings in the existing literature, however, when we assume a more general 
production technology with decreasing returns to scale in capital, their result is overturned.   
In general, we find that the welfare loss for the less wealthy country to fully liberalize its 
financial markets, if any, tends to fall with the share of capital in a Cobb-Douglas production 
function.  The gain from borrowing at a lower risk-free rate for reinvestment in the production 
technology is reduced when the production function exhibits diminishing returns to capital although 
the relationship is not everywhere monotonic.  The intuition behind this result is that with a smaller 
capital share in production, each additional unit of borrowed capital reinvested in production would 
yield a lower return and it becomes more likely that the welfare loss from imperfect risk sharing and 
inefficient allocation of capital will exceed the gain from reinvesting in the production technology. 
When the diminishing returns of capital in production is augmented by a higher labor endowment as 
well as the mean productivity growth of the technology, it becomes welfare-optimal for the stock 
markets of the less wealthy country to be closed to foreign investors. 
In our numerical analysis, where the parameter assumptions are selected to resemble China 
as the less wealthy country and the advanced economies (namely the US and the EU) as the 
wealthier counterpart, we find that the optimal financial market structure for China is one whereby 
the foreign entry to domestic loans markets and domestic access to foreign capital markets are shut 
down.  Under this financial structure, foreign investors purchase claims to China’s production in 
China’s capital markets at a sufficiently high price so that the gain from the proceeds exceeds the 
loss from reduced risk sharing.  However, the gain quickly disappears as China’s labor endowment 
falls or the capital share in her production increase to match that in the US and EU, and then 
financial liberalization dominates.  
Our welfare analyses in this paper show that both production technology and labor supply 
are important in evaluating the gains from f inancial markets liberalization. Mainly, our results 
suggest that the optimal financial market structure is likely to vary across countries or economic 
blocs or across time periods with different types of production technologies and demographics.  The 
specific numerical example of the Chinese economy that we consider serves as a case-study   4 
discussion to better understand the process of financial liberalization between countries or economic 
blocs in the international economy. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes the model we 
develop, and Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium in our models.  Section 4 presents a special 
case of analytical solution and reports the numerical results and analysis of the model. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2.  The Model 
In this section, we describe a two-period (t = 0,1), one-good production economy.  We assume 
there are two countries in our world economy, home and foreign (i = 1 and 2, respectively) with a 
representative household and firm in each country.  The representative household is assumed to 
have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences.  Each country is endowed with an initial 
capital stock, Ki, a fixed labor supply in both periods, Li, and a two-input Cobb-Douglas production 
technology that exhibits decreasing returns to capital.  The output, yi(s), in each country is produced 
by a representative competitive “local” firm using the endowed production technology.  Each 
production technology is subject to a random shock and the presence of international financial 
markets allows these shocks to be shared across countries. We assume that the home (foreign) firm 
is owned by the home (foreign) household in the initial period.  We interpret a country’s share of 
initial world capital stock as the initial wealth of the country.   Throughout our analysis, we will 
assume the home country to be less wealthy than the foreign country so that K1 < K2.. 
   5 
2.1  Household’s consumption choice 
We now describe the optimization problem faced by the representative household.  At time-0, each 
household i chooses its consumption, ci(s), its asset-claim to firm j’s output, sij, for j = {1,2}, and 
the amount to borrow or lend,  bi, to maximize its expected utility, given  
(i) its budget constraint in each period, (ii) the firm’s investment decision and (iii) the existing 
financial structure in the economy.  The dividend payment of the claim to the firm j is denoted by dj 
and the stock price of the same firm j is denoted by Sj. The world endogenous risk-free rate of 
return between the two periods is r and the rate of capital depreciation is assumed to be 100%.  
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subject to the time-0 and time-1 budget constraints, respectively, 
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   portfolio income 
The parameters for relative risk aversion and time preference factor for both households are 
denoted by  h and  b, respectively.  In a world with no uncertainty, h is the reciprocal of the 
household’s intertemporal elasticity of substitution.  
  The budget constraints (2.2) and (2.3) imply that the financial markets of both countries are 
perfectly open so that the household can borrow from or lend to each other, as well as trade in the 
claims of both firms.  The outlay for household i in the initial period comprises of its consumption 
in the period, its cost of purchasing shares in the local and foreign stock markets and the amount it 
lends in the international loans market.  This expenditure is funded by the initial dividend payout 
and value of its initial share holding, which is assumed to be 100% of its own domestic stock.  In 
the second period after the state is realized, the household consumes the payout from its portfolio 
choice, which consists of stock dividends and interest income.    6 
Discrete financial structure or segmentation in the financial markets will be modeled by 
imposing binary restrictions on the stock holdings and/or borrowing or lending by households.  For 
example, if the home stock market is not accessible to the foreign household, the home household is 
restricted to hold the entire claim to its own firm in both periods, i.e., s11 = 1 and s21 = 0.  Likewise, 
if domestic entry to foreign stock markets and international loans market is closed, i.e., s21 = 0, s22 = 
1 and b1 = 0.  In the extreme case of financial autarky where access to all financial markets are 
completely closed, sii = 1, sij = 0 and bi = 0 for both i,j = 1,2. 
 
2.2  Firm’s investment decision 
Next, we present the firm’s investment’s decision.  At time-0, each firm chooses the allocation of 
the initial capital stock between time-0 dividend payment (for immediate consumption by its time-0 
shareholder) and reinvestment (for time-1 production) to maximize its risk-adjusted present value.  
Each firm uses its original shareholder’s marginal rate of substitution of consumption between time-
0 and time-1 to determine the present value of its dividends.    When the firm is traded, the 
investment decision is the same whether the original or new shareholder’s marginal rate of 
substitution is used in the valuation of the firm’s profits. The proof of this claim will be presented in 
the appendix. The intuition is derived from the pricing-clearing mechanism that ensures both old and 
new shareholders’ marginal rates of substitution are jointly determined.  When the firm is not traded 
internationally, the firm’s sole shareholder’s marginal rate of substitution is used to value the firm’s 
profits.  Therefore, the marginal rate of substitution of the original shareholder of the stock  i, 
denoted by  ) (s i f  will always be the appropriate pricing kernel to value the firm i’s future dividend. 
We write the firm i’s maximization problem as follows. 
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where qi(s) is a random technology shock, and ai and (1-ai) are the respective factor shares of 
capital and labor in the production function.  Labor is assumed to be a fixed endowment and 
immobile across countries.  The technology shocks  qi(s) are assumed to follow a binomial 
distribution with mean mi > 1 and variance si
2 .   
  It is important that the household’s portfolio choice and the firm’s investment decision are 
determined simultaneously so that there are no discrepancies over the choice of dividend payment 
and investment level between the firm and its shareholders.  This point will be elaborated in the 
appendix.  At time-1, the firm’s dividends are distributed to its shareholders after the state is 
realized. 
 
2.3  Financial market structures 
In this subsection, we briefly describe the type of financial market structures that we examine in this 
paper in the context of how the different degrees of financial markets liberalizations within each 
structure affects the household’s ability to share risk.  We present the possible variations of financial 
market structures whereby the less wealthy country chooses which domestic financial markets to 
open from its current partially  liberalized financial markets structure.  We assume that foreign 
financial markets are completely open to all households.  Specifically, we consider three types of 
financial markets structure: 
i.  Complete financial markets liberalization – home loans and stock markets are open to 
foreign investment, where there are no restrictions on the portfolio variables sij  and bi 
for {i,j=1,2}. 
ii.  Closure of home stock markets  – only home stock market of the home country is 
closed to foreign investment, where s21 = 0, but there are no restrictions on si2 and bi 
for {i=1,2}.   8 
iii.  Closure of home financial markets – both home stock and loans markets are closed to 
foreign investment, where s21 = 0 and  b2 =0 but there are no restrictions on si2 for 
{i=1,2}. 
The types of financial structure described under (ii) and (iii) result in preventing foreign 
capital inflows into the less wealthy country, which is the initial position of most emerging countries.  
If an extreme structure of financial autarky is assumed, both capital inflows and outflows are 
restricted where households cannot trade in any financial asset. In this economy, there are no risk 
sharing between the two households, nor is capital allocated efficiently between the two production 
technologies. Basak (1996) notes that under financial autarky, households must be made better off 
in the presence of some financial openness.  This characteristic is observed in our model as well, 
since there are neither imperfections nor externalities in the goods market.  We will focus on the 
welfare implications of moving towards complete financial markets liberalization from the partially 
liberalized financial market structures described (ii) and (iii).   
In the presence of partial or perfect financial openness, households can use the available 
financial assets to achieve both intratemporal risk sharing and intertemporal consumption 
smoothing, while firms achieve efficient allocation of capital to their production technology using the 
households’ marginal rates of intertemporal substitution as the pricing kernel.  Therefore in our 
model, portfolio choice in the financial markets has repercussions in the allocation of capital in the 
real economy via their cost of financing investment. It is not clear whether each household will be 
made better off by expanding the menu of financial assets under less then perfect financial markets, 
since introducing financial assets will alter the investment decision, as well as the cost of risk sharing 
and intertemporal consumption smoothing. 
 
2.4  Production technology 
  As the production technology affects the efficient capital allocation between the two 
countries, it plays an important role in determining the price of risk sharing in the presence of some 
financial structure.  We will discuss how the capital share in the production technology relates to the 
increase in risk premium of partially relative to fully liberalized financial markets in the framework 
we constructed. In the special case where the capital share is one and production is linear in capital, 
the marginal product of capital is a constant and the optimal investment decision is a corner 
solution. Capital will flow to the country with higher risk-adjusted productivity.  When production   9 
exhibits decreasing returns to scale in capital, the optimal investment decision is an interior solution.  
Even in the absence of uncertainty, capital will be allocated between the two production 
technologies such that their marginal products of capital are equal.  Where the two production 
technologies differ, any form of financial structure that allows capital to flow between the two 
production technologies will benefit both countries and all types of international financial structures 
are equivalent in a world without uncertainty. 
In a world with uncertainty, there are gains from risk sharing when investment is diversified 
across the production technologies in the two countries. When financial markets are not fully 
liberalized, risk sharing is not perfect.  Consequently, the risk premium will be relatively higher and 
cost of borrowed capital lower in partially relative to fully liberalized financial markets. Since the 
investment decision is determined by the net cost of borrowed capital, the allocation of capital will 
deviate from the efficient level with the loss of risk sharing when financial markets are not 
completely liberalized.  The gains/cost of financial liberalization will be related to how the 
production technologies affect the cost of risk sharing and returns from capital. 
When financial markets are not completely liberalized, a wealthier country can only invest 
in the less wealthy country’s production technology via lending.  The less wealthy country then 
reinvests the borrowed capital in its production technology and it will be made better off if the 
reinvestment rate (which equals the marginal product of capital) exceeds the risk-free rate at which 
it borrows.  Where the equilibrium risk-free rate is a risk-adjusted weighted average of the marginal 
product of capital in the two technologies, the change in financial  market structure and/or shift of 
investment from one technology to the other will change the weights and hence, cause the risk-free 
rate to adjust accordingly.  Moreover, when the production technology exhibits decreasing returns 
to scale in capital, an increase in investment will generate a fall in the marginal product of capital.  
Consequently, an additional unit of capital borrowed and reinvested will reap lower return than the 
prior unit.  In this world, the differential gain from return on capital invested in production and the 
risk-free rate is less likely to outweigh the loss of risk sharing for the less wealthy country as it 
restricts access to its financial markets. 
The discussion suggests that the production technology plays an important role in 
determining the gain/cost from financial markets liberalization via its influence on the risk-adjusted 
marginal product of borrowed capital.  The loss of risk sharing is less likely to be outweighed by the 
gain from taking advantage of a higher risk premium  in less than complete liberalized financial 
markets as production moves away from a linear technology in capital.  When the production   10 
technology is a two-input Cobb-Douglas function, the marginal product of capital will also vary 
positively with the exogenous productivity growth and labor endowment of each country.  
Consequently in our model, the favorable conditions for a less wealthy country to be made better 
off under a restrictive financial structure are (1) close to linear production technology, (2) higher 
productivity growth and (3) higher labor endowment. 
 
3.  Equilibrium  
The solution to our model consists of the competitive equilibrium of the household’s and firm’s 
maximization problems.  We solve the model by imposing the assumptions that translate into the 
types of financial market structure described in Section 2.3.  Table 1 provides a summary of the 
assumptions and parameters.  The welfare evaluation of each degree of financial markets 
liberalization is derived by substituting the competitive equilibrium obtained in solving out the model 
back into the individual household’s utility function. The utility values associated with the different 
degrees of liberalization are then ranked.  We assume that each country will choose the degree of 
financial markets liberalization that commands the highest utility value. 
 
3.1  Competitive Equilibrium 
The first order conditions for the home household’s maximization problem give the following risk-
free rate and asset prices in the financial markets: 
    [ ] 0 ()(1)1 i Esr f +=    ,          (3.1) 
[ ] 0 ()() iii EsdsS f =    ,    i,j = {1,2}    (3.2) 
The pricing kernel of the traded assets for household i is given by fi(s), and it is the marginal rate of 
intertemporal substitution described in equation (2.5).  The use of fi(s) as a pricing kernel is derived 
from an intertemporal Euler condition corresponding to equation (3.1).  This approach of valuation 
of dividends represented in Equation (3.2) is an application of the consumption-based capital asset 
pricing model.  In equilibrium, the market-clearing price of the traded asset will equate the risk-
adjusted expected value of a firm’s future dividends for both the home and the foreign households. 
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The investment decision is chosen so that household i’s risk-adjusted expected marginal product of 
capital at time-1 equals the marginal cost of investment at time-0.  The cost of investment is the 
dividend foregone at time-0.  Hence, the firm trades off lower dividend (due to higher investment) 
in the initial period with higher dividend (due to higher production from higher investment) in the 
next period.  When household j’s (instead of i’s) marginal rate of substitution is used to value the 
profits of the firm i, the first order condition for the investment decision becomes: 
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  We will show in the appendix that the firm’s optimal investment decision is the same 
whether the firm is valued using the home (i) or foreign (j) household’s marginal rate of substitution 
by demonstrating that equations (3.3) and (3.4) are consistent with each other.  In this case, both 
shareholders (home and foreign) will agree on the investment level for a firm as long as they both 
trade the claim to the firm even in the absence of complete markets.
2  The intuition behind this 
result is that the trading of the claim to future dividends of the firm forces both households to reach 
an agreement on the risk-adjusted (by their marginal rates of substitution) expected value of these 
dividends.  This process lines up their investment decisions in determining these future dividends.
3  
When the claim to the firm is not traded between the two households, the firm will use the marginal 
rates of substitution of its shareholder (who is now the domestic household) to value its dividends.  
  The market clearing conditions in the financial markets are: 
1121 1 ss +=    ,            (3.5) 
1222 1 ss +=    ,            (3.6) 
12 0 bb +=    .            (3.7) 
  The competitive equilibrium is obtained by solving the first order conditions (3.1), (3.2), 
and the budget constraints  (2.2) and (2.3) for each household, the first order condition (3.3) for 
                                                             
2 Ekern and Wilson (1974) state that the condition under which this statement holds is where investment 
decision does not change the set of return distributions available to the entire economy.  The condition is 
satisfied in our model as the production shocks are exogenous and independent of the firm’s investment 
decision. This result is shown in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, p.309).   12 
each firm, and the financial market-clearing conditions (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7). The equilibrium stock 
price can be solved from the household’s portfolio choice in  (3.2) and the firm’s investment 









3.2  A world with certainty 
We provide the intuition behind our numerical results by studying a special case where the volatility 
of production technology shocks is equal to zero in the economy.  When there is no uncertainty, all 
types of financial markets are equivalent so long as there exists a financial asset for households to 
move their capital across the two production technologies.  With the exception of financial autarky, 
all types of financial markets described in Section 2.3 fulfill this criterion.  With any sort of 
international financial market, each household will consume in equilibrium the same proportion of 
total production in the real goods sector for both time periods.  The proportion depends on their 
initial endowment of capital and labor as well as the production technology (namely, the 
productivity growth and the production function).  
  The equilibrium rate of borrowing equates the marginal products of capital in both 
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When the production technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale such that  ái < 1, capital is 
invested in both countries’ production.  Moreover, the shift of capital in the production technology 
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increase in capital decreases the marginal product and vice versa.  Figure 1 provides an illustration 
to how the marginal product of capital relates to investment with linear and non-linear production 
technologies.  In equilibrium, the marginal product of capital will equate between the two 
technologies.  The efficient investment allocation is an interior solution where the investment share 
is positively related to the mean productivity growth of the technology. The ratio of investment in 
each production technology is expressed as:  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3 It is important that the portfolio decisions, which in equilibrium equate the risk-adjusted expected value 
of the dividends between the two households, are made simultaneously with the firm’s investment 
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The above relationship  (3.9) shows that the ratio varies positively with the capital share of 
production technology, á. Consequently, as the production technology exhibits higher returns to 
scale in capital, more investment will be allocated to the technology with higher mean productivity 
growth. In the special case of linear production technology, where the technology exhibits constant 
returns to scale in capital, all capital flows to the country whose production has a higher mean 
productivity growth ìhigh.  Here, labor does not play a role in production and the marginal product 
of capital ìhigh is independent of capital movement.   
If the production technology is risky, partial financial markets liberalization imposes a cost 
for both countries, as the risk sharing would be imperfect.  With a technology that exhibits 
decreasing returns to capital, each additional unit of capital borrowed and invested in the technology 
brings about a lower return.  Under this scenario, the loss in risk sharing is likely to outweigh the 
gain from borrowing at a lower risk-free rate and investing in a higher-return risky technology for a 
less wealthy country.  
 
4.  Main Results 
In this section, we present the main results of our model.  First, we solve a special case of model by 
assuming certainty, logarithmic preferences and symmetry across the two countries, with the 
exception of initial capital endowment.  Next, we perturb the economy by adding noise to the 
production technologies and solve the model with complete financial liberalization.  Finally, we 
present and discuss the numerical results for a more general economy under different scenarios. 
 
4.1  Symmetric economy 
We solve the equilibrium analytically in a stylized economy where both countries are identical, 
except for their initial capital endowment.  There are two roles for international capital mobility in 
this economy: (i) efficient allocation of capital and (ii) risk sharing of technology shocks across 
countries.  In the special case where both production technologies exhibit constant returns to scale   14 
in capital, the first role is obliterated since the marginal product of capital becomes a constant.  
Hence, the only role for international capital flows is to achieve risk sharing across countries.  
 
4.1.1  A world with certainty 
We present the solutions for a world with certainty, where ó = 0.  The equilibrium investment 
decision equates the marginal products of capital across the two countries and attains an efficient 
allocation of world capital.  Risk sharing is irrelevant in this economy. The equilibrium solutions for 
{i=1,2} are solved as the following. 
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By comparing the equilibrium solutions presented above, we observe that the less wealthy 
country is definitely better off with financial markets liberalization relative to an autarky 
arrangement. If the production technology were to exhibit constant returns to scale such that á=1, 
then the consumption solutions are  identical under both financial market structures.  In a more 
general case where á<1, equilibrium investment is allocated across the two production technologies 
to achieve efficient capital allocation. In the economy considered in this section, we find a negative 
relationship between the welfare gains of financial markets liberalization and the capital share of the 
production technology,  á.  Intuitively, there is more to gain by reallocation of capital from the 
wealthier country to the less wealthy country w hen each additional unit capital invested in the   15 
technology faces a sharper decline in its marginal product. The sufficient but not necessary 
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where e ￿ 2.7183. 
Proposition 1: In a world with certainty and symmetric production technologies and households’ 
preferences, the welfare gains of both countries from financial markets liberalization increases 
with a s maller share of capital in its production technology. This inverse relationship holds 
definitely for less wealthy country if it is endowed with less than 1/(2e) of the world’s capital. 
  The proposition suggests that the welfare gains from efficient allocation of capital increases 
as the capital share in the production technologies falls.  Therefore, it would be reasonable to infer 
that when complete financial markets liberalization achieves full risk sharing and efficient capital 
allocation, the welfare gains derived from these two roles would be decreasing in the capital share of 
the production technology,  á.  We confirm this point analytically and numerically in the latter 
sections. 
 
4.1.2  A world with symmetric technology shocks 
We perturb the previous economy with symmetric technology shocks such that ói = ó for i={1,2} 
and solve the model with second-order Taylor series expansion.  Due the complexity of the resulting 
non-linear equations, we are able to solve the model analytically only under the case of complete 
financial market liberalization.  We find that adding uncertainty to the economy does not change the 
optimal investment decision when perfect risk-sharing is attained under complete financial markets 
liberalization.  Consequently, the inference from Proposition 1 on the inverse relationship between 
welfare gains from complete financial markets liberalization will still hold even in the presence of 
uncertainty.  Although the real investment decisions are not affected by the addition of technology 
shocks, the cost of borrowing (or the world risk-free rate) is reduced by factor of 1/(1+0.25ó
2).  In 
a symmetric world, risk-free borrowing and lending is not utilized when financial markets are 
complete liberalized.  Here, households are able to perfect risk sharing and optimal consumption 
smoothing by holding a proportion of the domestic and foreign stocks equivalent to their share of   16 
initial wealth endowment.  As a result, the real investment decisions are not affected by the change 
in cost of borrowing. 
When the financial markets are not complete liberalized, the imperfect risk sharing will 
drive down the risk-free rate and the cost of borrowing.  Suppose we consider the partially 
liberalized financial markets structure described in (ii) of Section 2.3, where domestic stock markets 
of the less wealthy country is closed.  In this world, the less wealthy country needs to borrow in the 
loans markets and the equilibrium investment decisions will be affected by the change in cost of 
borrowing.  The numerical r esults reported in the next section show that investment in the 
production technology of the less wealthy country under this assumed partial liberalized financial 
markets is relative less than the efficient capital allocation with perfect risk sharing.  The reduced 
investment in the less wealthy country as a result of its closed domestic stock market will drive a 
wedge between its risk-adjusted marginal product of capital and the lower world risk-free rate. 
Consequently, this less wealthy country can potentially benefit from partially liberalized financial 
markets. 
 
4.2  Numerical results for a more general economy 
Due to the non-linearity in the system of equilibrium equations, we are not able to obtain analytical 
solutions for a more general economy.  Here we solve our model numerically for a set of values of 
relative risk aversion parameter, h, time preference factor, b, initial capital endowment, Ki, labor 
supply, Li, mean and standard deviation of the productivity shocks, mi, and si under the three 
financial market structures described in Section 2.3.   
We compute the welfare gains as the percentage of change in household’s utility after the 
restrictive home financial markets become becomes completely liberalized to achieve perfect risk-
sharing. Consequently, a positive value is associated with a gain in welfare from complete financial 
liberalization and vice versa.  Specifically, we provide numerical results for two specific economies.  
The first economy is created to illustrate how the production technology is related to the risk-free 
rate of borrowing.  It serves to compare and contrast our model with previous research in this area.  
The second economy is calibrated to represent a more practical case analysis of opening China’s 
financial markets to the rest of the world. 
   17 
4.2.1  Symmetric production technologies 
In this section, we extend our analysis in the previous section to more general financial markets 
structure and continue to consider two countries with identical production technologies.  The two 
countries differ from each other only in terms of capital endowment.   The purpose of studying this 
unique economy is to understand how the type of production technology and hence, marginal 
product of capital affects the risk-free rate (of borrowing) in the  economy.  In our modeling 
framework as well as previous works in this area by Sellin and Werner (1993), Basak (1996) and 
Devereux and Saito (1997), there are no frictions in the real and financial markets.  Consequently, 
the only reason why a less wealthy country could be made better off with less than complete 
financial markets comes from their ability to borrow capital at a lower risk-free rate and reinvest the 
capital in more productive and riskier technology with relatively higher expected returns. In t he 
mentioned previous works, Basak (1996) assumed exogenous returns in a portfolio model while 
Sellin and Werner (1993) and Devereux and Saito (1997) assumed a very special case of linear 
production technology in an investment model.  Their frameworks are very similar when production 
is linear in capital because an investment decision is equivalent to a portfolio choice in this setup. 
  Our analysis is complementary to their work by extending their framework to allow the 
marginal product of capital to depend on the investment decisions.  The endogeneity of the marginal 
product of capital plays an important role in evaluating the welfare implications of financial markets 
liberalization because it is directly related to the marginal return of one additional unit of borrowed 
capital invested in the risky production. When marginal return decreases with capital, any gain from 
being able to borrow capital at a lower risk-free rate to reinvest in riskier production falls with every 
additional unit of capital and reduces any potential benefit from partial financial markets 
liberalization for the less wealthy country. 
  We assume that the home and foreign countries are endowed with 25% and 75% of the 
world capital stock, respectively.  Each country is given one unit of labor endowment in this section 
so that the numerical results do not depend on labor. The relative risk aversion parameter, h, is 
assumed be unity so that households effectively have logarithmic preference. The time preference 
factor, b, is parameterized to be 0.98. The productivity shocks in production follow a binomial 
distribution with mi=1.075 and standard deviation of si=0.03. The assumptions correspond to a 
emerging economies’ output growth of mean 7.5% and volatility of 3%. The correlation between 
the shocks is assumed to be zero.    18 
  The numerical results are presented in Figures 2, 3 and 4.  Figure 2 depicts the welfare gain 
for the less wealthy country in an off-equilibrium economy where the efficient capital allocation is 
determined as if there is no uncertainty.  There is an inverse relationship between the welfare gain 
from the off-equilibrium efficient capital allocation and  á.  This observation is consistent with 
Proposition 1, where welfare gain from efficient capital allocation with financial liberalization 
increases when á falls.  Consequently, we observe in figure 3 that the relationship between the 
welfare gain of financial markets liberalization is generally rises as the capital share of production 
technology, á, falls.  The only exception occurs when á￿1, where there are some discontinuity due 
to the corner solution at  á=1.  This inverse relationship is consistent with our discussion of the 
analytical results in Section 4.1, where welfare gains from efficient capital allocation between the 
production technologies, achieved under perfect risk sharing in complete financial markets 
liberalization, varies inversely with the capital share of production technology, á.  By introducing 
diminishing marginal product of capital in technologies, we introduce a role for complete financial 
markets liberalization in the real goods markets whereby a more efficient allocation of capital is 
attained. 
Figure 2 also shows that the only technology that a country is made better off with partial 
financial markets in  this unique world is linear in capital.  When production technology exhibits 
diminishing returns to capital, an additional borrowed unit of capital invested in the risky production 
will yield a rise in production that is less than the previous unit of capital.  In this scenario, the 
reinvestment rate is not constant and falls with capital.  Therefore, the marginal benefit of 
borrowing capital at a lower risk-free rate and reinvesting it in a diminishing returns production with 
partial financial markets is l ess likely to outweigh the marginal cost of loss in risk sharing and 
inefficient allocation of capital.   
For a less wealthy country, the welfare benefits from partial financial markets liberalization 
arise when it takes advantage of the higher risk premium to borrow at a lower risk-free rate.  As the 
financial markets become more liberalized, the risk-free rate increases as risk premium falls with 
better risk sharing.  We apply this relationship in our interpretation of the difference between the 
risk-free rates under complete and partial financial markets liberalization as a measure of “risk 
premium” for the country as it moves from complete to partial financial markets liberalization. 
Figure 4 plots the risk-free rate differentials under partial markets l iberalization whereby the less 
wealthy country closes its domestic stock markets to foreign investors and borrows in the 
international loans markets.  Comparison of Figures 3 and 4 illustrates that welfare gains from   19 
complete financial markets vary inversely with the “risk premium” of the partial financial markets.  
The inverse relationship suggests that the less wealthy country would be likely to benefit from 
partial financial markets liberalization when it can take advantage of borrowing at a lower risk-free 
rate with the greater “risk premium” as it moves away from complete financial markets 
liberalization. 
From Figures 3 and 4, we see that the inverse relationship between welfare gains and “risk 
premium” breaks down as the production technology approaches linear.  There is a clear 
discontinuity in the behavior of welfare gains of financial liberalization and the “risk premium” from 
the general trend with the assumption of a linear production. The observations from the numerical 
results in this section demonstrate that the production technology plays an important role in studying 
the gains from financial markets liberalization and linear production is a very special case.   
 
4.2.2  A applied case study on China 
In this section, we choose to calibrate the parameters to resemble a two-country economy that 
represents China and the advance economy of the US and EU in this section.  At present, China’s 
capital markets are still relatively segmented under the classification of A and B shares.  Class A 
shares can be held by local investors only, while class B shares can be traded by both local and 
foreign investors. Moreover, renminbi is still hard pegged to the US dollar and not traded as an 
international currency, rendering access to any asset markets within China  effectively more 
restrictive than it appears. With China’s accession to WTO and the potential size of her economy, 
the issue of liberalizing her financial markets is a relevant and interesting one to analyze in the 
context of our modeling framework.  It is our hope that the results would present some useful 
perspectives in evaluating the role of financial markets liberalization by linking the efficiency of 
capital allocation across production technologies with the risk premium and investment returns in 
the financial markets. 
From the data published in IMF World Economic Outlook, we approximate China’s share 
of the world capital stock to be one-third that of the US and EU.  Using population as a crude proxy 
for labor force, her share of world labor endowment would be about 1.5 times that of the US and 
EU.   For the past 10 years, the output of China and the advanced economies are estimated to vary 
with volatilities of 3% and 1% respectively.  The correlation coefficient between the two output 
variations is roughly –0.5.  Using various forecasts of output growth in the two regions for the   20 
coming year, we assume the mean average productivity shock to be 1.075 for China and 1.025 for 
the US and EU.  A relative risk aversion parameter of 2 and time preference factor of 0.98 are 
assumed for all households.  The interpretation of this economy is one in which China is capital-
poor (less wealthy) with a relatively higher growth and riskier production technology, while the 
advanced economy of the west is capital-rich (wealthier) with relatively lower-growth and les risky 
production technology and open financial markets.  We do not consider linear technology in this 
section, as we will obtain a near-corner solution in equilibrium with the mean and volatility 
assumptions on the productivity shocks.  
 
Scenario 1:  Symmetric production functional form (á1 = á2) 
First, we consider an economy where both production technologies take the same functional form 
such that the capital share in production  ái = á for {i=1,2} is identical  across the two regions.  
Figure 5 illustrates the welfare gains/loss from off-equilibrium capital allocation (determined in a 
world with certainty), figure 6 shows the results of welfare gains/loss of complete financial markets 
and Figures 7 plots the increase in “risk premium” of a shift from complete to partial financial 
markets.  
Figure 5 shows the same inverse relationship between welfare gains from off-equilibrium 
efficient capital allocation as the symmetric economy.  As á increases beyond 0.8, the gain from 
efficient capital allocation is outweighed by the loss from imperfect risk-sharing off equilibrium.  
Figure 7 illustrates that the cost of imperfect risk-sharing is imputed in the increasing “risk 
premium” as with greater á, where the rate of increase is more rapid for á greater than 0.8.   
We observe from figure 6 that t he less wealthy country would gain from partial (as 
compared to complete) liberalized financial markets as the capital share of production, á, becomes 
greater than 0.7.  As the labor endowment and mean productivity growth of the less wealthy 
country is relatively higher than the wealthy country, its marginal product of capital increases at a 
faster rate given that á1 = á2 = á. Hence, the benefits of the less wealthy country from borrowing at 
a lower risk-free rate in partial financial market structure would rise with á and it will have more 
incentives to restrict foreign access to its production.  The observation that gains from completely 
liberalizing financial markets increases with lower á is consistent with our analytical results in 
Section 4.1, where we show that the marginal cost of inefficient capital allocation as a result of loss   21 
in risk-sharing increases with á.  The optimal financial structure for the less wealthy country when á 
lies between 0.7 and 0.8 is one whereby home stock markets are closed to foreign investors but 
foreign investors are allowed to lend directly to home households. When á takes a value greater 
than 0.8, the less wealthy country benefits the most by closing both home stock and loans markets 
to foreign investment.  In this scenario, the less wealthy country would be borrowing from the stock 
markets in the advanced economies. 
 
Scenario 2:  Asymmetric production functional form (ái „ ái) 
Next we hold the production technology of the advanced economy constant under the postulation 
that most advanced countries have attained a steady state of development whereby their production 
technology is relatively stable. Our analysis starts with a position that the less wealthy country is 
relatively more labor- rather than capital-intensive at its initial stage of development.  Thus, we 
choose to study how the welfare gains from complete financial markets could vary as the 
production technology of the less wealthy country becomes increasingly less labor-intensive.  Here 
we fix á2 at 0.5 for the capital-rich economy j and vary á1 for the less wealthy home country.  The 
choice of  á2 = 0.5 follows from the empirical evidence shown by Stockman and Tesar (1990) 
suggesting that the capital share for G7 countries range from 0.35 to 0.5.  We will discuss the 
choice of á2 will lead to a shift in the welfare gains from complete financial markets for the less 
wealthy country. 
The results are plotted in Figure 8 and the observations are consistent with the previous 
example where á1 = á2.  We also find the inverse relationships between welfare gains of complete 
financial markets and “risk premium” described in section 4.2.1 to be robust to the parameter 
change.  When  á1 > 0.55 for the less wealthy country, it benefits most by restricting foreign 
investment in home financial markets, which is the same outcome as the previous example at higher 
values of  á1 =  á2.  It is worthwhile to note that the values of  á1 whereby partially liberalized 
financial markets are more beneficial for the less wealthy country are greater than  á2.  This 
observation implies that the less wealthy country is better off with partial financial markets 
liberalization when the capital share in its production is higher than the developed economies. The 
choice of the fixed á2 for the production technology in the capital-rich region serves to determine   22 
the “cutoff” point for the dominance in the two different partial financial market structures. Our 
results thus far lead to the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: A less wealthy country is more likely to benefit from partial relative to complete 
financial markets liberalization when each additional capital it borrows at the lower risk-free 
rate is reinvested in a production technology that exhibits higher returns to capital.  
The proposition suggests the any gain of a less wealthy country from restricting foreign 
access to its financial markets is likely to go away when the marginal product of capital is decreasing 
with investment.  Therefore, complete financial markets liberalization is likely to be optimal for 
most emerging economies with low capital share in their production technologies. 
 
Scenario 3:  Variable labor endowment share and mean output growth 
In this analysis, we maintain our assumption from the previous scenario that á1=0.35 and á2=0.5 in 
while allowing labor endowment and the mean output growth of the less wealth country to vary 
independently.   In essence, we allow the demographics to change between the two countries or 
regions to change by varying the distribution of world labor endowment share between the two 
countries.  A higher labor endowment would amount to higher marginal product of capital in 
equilibrium.  The welfare results are plotted in Figure 9.  The welfare curves are relatively self-
explanatory and the less wealthy country is made better off under partial financial market structure 
when its labor endowment increases.  Keeping the domestic stock market closed to foreign 
investment is optimal when the labor endowment exceeds roughly 65% of the world’s labor supply.   
In addition, we verify that partial financial markets liberalization is optimal when the mean 
output growth of the less wealthy country is very much higher than the advanced economies.  We 
assume that labor endowment does not play a role when we vary the mean output growth.   Figure 
10 plots the welfare results and show that partial financial markets liberalization for the less wealthy 
country is optimal when its mean output growth is extremely high. Therefore, we conclude this 
subsection with our final proposition. 
Proposition 3: Any exogenous factor such as higher labor endowment that augments the marginal 
product of capital in equilibrium will increase the likelihood that a less wealthy country would be 
benefit from a partial financial market structure.   23 
The implication of the proposition is consistent with the discussions in the previous 
subsection, whereby complete financial markets liberalization dominates when the capital share in 
the production technology of the less wealthy country is low.  When the same country is endowed 
with a relatively small labor endowment, its marginal product of capital remains low and there are 
no gains from restricting its home financial markets.  Closure of foreign access to home financial 
markets is beneficial only when the labor endowment of the less wealthy country is sufficiently high 
to boost its marginal product of capital.   
 
4.2.3  Discussion of numerical results 
In general, our numerical results in this section confirm our theoretical analysis that the type of 
production technology plays a very important role in evaluating the welfare gains from financial 
markets.  Specifically, the nature of the production technology will imply a marginal product of 
capital that will affect the reinvestment rate of borrowed capital. We also find that exogenous factor 
(such as labor endowment) that increases the marginal product of capital of the country will raise 
the benefits of partial financial markets for a less wealthy country.  In short, we can suggest the 
optimal financial structure for a less wealthy country with a relatively high productivity growth and 
labor endowment compared to the rest of the world is a restricted one.  
Our numerical results using China for parameterization as a case study suggest the 
following. When the production technology of the less wealthy country has a significantly smaller 
capital share and its labor endowment is relatively high compared the rest of the world, it is 
beneficial for the country to restrict foreign access to its domestic financial markets. This 
observation from the numerical analysis is relatively consistent with the current arrangement within 
the Chinese financial markets. Currently, the non-liquidity of renminbi restricts its convertibility in 
the international currency markets and thus significantly raises the transactional costs for foreign 
investors who want to invest in the domestic stock markets.  In addition, foreign banks are not 
allowed to solicit renminbi deposits from Chinese households nor provide loans to local Chinese 
firms without a form of guarantee from domestic Chinese banks.  Effectively, the foreign investors 
are restricted from providing foreign funds to the Chinese households and firms directly.  At the 
same time, the Chinese stock markets do not allow foreign investors to trade in all their shares via 
different classification of the share types.  In this sense, foreign investors have very limited access 
to the Chinese financial markets.     24 
We attempt to emulate the current Chinese financial arrangement whereby foreign investors 
already own a proportion of the claim to the Chinese production.  The gains from financial 
liberalization are illustrated in Figure 11.  The figure shows that the partially liberalized financial 
markets where China restricts foreign access to its domestic financial markets remains optimal so 
long as foreign investors hold less than approximately 22% of Chinese stocks initially. However, as 
the proportion increases beyond 22%, it becomes optimal for China to completely liberalize her 
financial markets.  Therefore, there is support for complete financial liberalization for China if more 
foreign investors hold type A shares in the future.  In addition, we vary the initial debt level of 
China as a percentage of its capital endowment.  We find that the initial debt only serves to 
introduce a wealth effect into the initial endowment without affecting the results.  Finally, we 
conduct a robustness check on the numerical results to changes in the correlation coefficient of the 
two productivity shocks.  We find that financial market structure is not affected by the assumptions 
on correlation coefficient. 
Our numerical analysis would suggest that as the Chinese production technology develops 
to become more capital-intensive to catch up the advanced economies in the future, the optimal 
financial market structure would that of complete financial liberalization.  On the other hand, if the 
labor supply in the advanced economies falls relative to China as a result of continued low birth 
rates, then optimal financial market structure would be one whereby foreign access to home loans 
and capital markets will be closed.  However, we argue that this scenario is highly unlikely as the 
China has been successful in her population control policy. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
This paper has shown that optimal financial structure between two large countries depends on their 
relative production technologies, labor endowments and productivity growths. In our general 
equilibrium production model, the role of financial markets is threefold: intra-temporal cross-country 
risk sharing, inter-temporal consumption smoothing, and efficient allocation of capital in production.  
The importance of the link between goods and financial markets is highlighted by how a country’s 
production technology, productivity and labor endowment influence its optimal financial market 
structure.   
In previous models where a linear production technology was assumed, a less wealthy 
country may be better off with imperfect financial openness if it can borrow at a lower risk-free rate 
and invest at a higher rate of return.  We show that the optimal financial market structure for the   25 
same less wealthy country is likely to be one of complete financial markets when a genesral Cobb-
Douglas production technology with decreasing returns to capital is assumed.  However, if the less 
wealthy country that has a relatively higher productivity growth were to be endowed with large 
labor force, it would still benefit from restricting foreign access to its financial markets under the 
assumption of a general production technology.  In this sense, our finding is complementary to the 
results in Basak (1996) and Devereux and Saito (1997). 
We postulate that the production technology of countries differs as a result of geography, 
demographics and resource endowment. Moreover, the production technology evolves over time as 
countries develop. Therefore, the same unit of capital invested in a production technology across 
countries (either emerging or developed) will not command the same marginal product. By this 
argument, the gains from financial markets liberalization will not only diverge across countries, but 
will also change over time within the same country.  Our results suggest that production 
technologies and demographics in different economic trade zones will affect the benefits of financial 
markets liberalization between these zones.   In conclusion, there is no one-solution-fits-all financial 
market structure.   26 
Appendix 
Equivalence of Investment Decision 
In this section, we will show that a firm’s investment decision is the same using either the home or 
foreign household’s marginal rate of substitution as the pricing kernel when the claim to the firm is 
traded by both households. In essence, we demonstrate the equivalence of equations (3.3) and (3.4) 
in the main text. We observe that the left-hand side of equations (3.3) is the derivative of the home 
household’s risk-adjusted expectation of firm 1’s dividend payment with respect to the firm’s 
investment decision.  Similarly, the left-hand side of (3.4) is equivalent to the derivative of the 
foreign household’s risk-adjusted expectation of firm 1’s dividends with respect to the firm’s 
investment decision.  The derivatives are obtained by partially differentiating the first order 
conditions for the home and the foreign household’s portfolio choice of the claim to firm 1 with 
respect to the firm’s investment decision: 
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The presence of an equilibrium price for the claim to firm 1, S1, equates the right hand side of both 
equations (A1) and (A2).  This implies that: 
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The left hand side of equation (A4) equals the left hand side of equation (3.3) in the main text, 
where the home household’s marginal rate of substitution is used to value the firm’s profits.  The 
right hand side of equation (A4) equals the left hand side of equation (3.4) in the main text, where 
the foreign household’s marginal rate of substitution is used to value the firm’s profits. The equality 
of (A4) implies that the investment decision is the same regardless of whose marginal rate of 
substitution is used to value the firm’s profits.  The equilibrium condition on the market-clearing 
price of the traded claim to a firm causes the firm’s optimal investment decision to be the same for 
both households (who are both shareholders of the firm).   27 
 
A Special Case of Linear Production Technology 
In this section, we show that in special case of linear production technology, an investment model is 
equivalent to a portfolio model.  The budget constraints of the home household in an investment 
model are given by: 
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where Iij is the investment of household I in firm j’s production technology.  The budget constraints 
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For both models to be equivalent, the payout from home (foreign) investment must equal the 
payout from the portfolio choice in home (foreign) stock for each household.  This implies that: 
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In a two-country economy, the sum of the home and foreign household’s investment in firm  j’s 
production must aggregate to the world investment in the production.  Thus, the following equality 
must hold: I1j + I2j = Ij.  Using this aggregation equation and the market-clearing condition that s1j + 
s2j = 1, the sum of equations (A9) and (A10) gives: 
( ) [ ] ( ) q q
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1 2
1 + = +
- -    .       (A11) 
A sufficient condition for the right hand side to equate to the left hand side in equation (A11) is 
a=1, where the production technology is linear in capital.  When a=1, equations (A9) and (A10)   28 
imply that I1j = s 1j Ij and I2j =  s 2j Ij, where a household’s investment decision is equivalent to its 
portfolio decision when production is linear in capital.  Therefore, the findings in the special case 
should be consistent between our model and the related models described at the beginning of 
subsection 4.2.1.   29 
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Figure 1. Returns to capital with linear and non-linear production technology. 
 



















Figure 2. Welfare gain in off-equilibrium from efficient capital allocation determined under certainty 
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Figure 3. Welfare gains moving from partial to complete financial markets liberalization with 






























































































Figure 4. Risk premium (r
C – r
P) of partial financial markets structure, where P refers to the 
partially liberalized financial market structure under (ii) and (iii) described in Section 2.3.   33 






















Figure 5. Welfare gain in off-equilibrium from efficient capital allocation determined under certainty 








































































































Figure 6. Welfare gains moving from partial to complete financial markets liberalization with 
parametization for China as country 1 and the advanced economies as country 2 where a1=a2=a.  
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Figure 7. Risk premium of partial financial markets with parameterization for China as country 1 










































































































Figure 8. Welfare gains moving from partial to complete financial markets liberalization with 
parameterization for China as country 1 and the advanced economies as country 2 where a1￿a2 
anda2 = 0.5. 
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Figure 9. Welfare gains moving from partial to complete financial markets liberalization with 
parameterization for China as country 1 and the advanced economies as country 2, where a1 = 
0.35 anda2 = 0.5. 
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Figure 10. Welfare gains moving from partial to complete financial markets with parameterization 
for China as country 1 and the advanced economies as country 2, assuming labor endowment does 
not play a role, a1=0.35 anda2 = 0.5.   36 
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Figure 11. Welfare gains moving from partial to complete financial markets liberalization with 
parameterization for China as country 1 and the advanced economies as country 2, where labor 
endowment of country 1 assumed to be 70%, a1=0.35 anda2 = 0.5. 
 
 
 